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Worker, Businessman, Entrepreneur?: Kenya’s Shifting Labouring Subject  
 
Abstract 
Entrepreneurship is increasingly promoted as a salve for the political problem of jobless 
growth and shrinking state coffers. But, its contemporary position at the frontiers of 
African capitalism is premised on nearly a century of attention on the African ‘economic 
man’, figured and reconfigured through efforts of governments and international 
development institutions. This paper traces a genealogy of this labouring subject in Kenya, 
describing the ideological, discursive and material practices undertaken to mould African 
workers into productive economic agents. Across colonial and post-colonial periods, and 
within different employment contexts, the purported African habitus has been construed as 
an obstacle to progress, one that can be surmounted through the acquisition of enterprising 
qualities and entrepreneurial dispositions. Steeped in an ideal of selfhood as individualistic, 
industrious and future-oriented, the productive economic man has come to represent a set 
of ideas about the future of the nation, and is deeply entwined with moral valuations of 
Kenya’s citizenry and with idioms of development and economic growth. The paper details 
how the productive and enterprising subject is continually invoked as a response to shifting 




Africa’s economies appear to be emerging anew from the long durée of structural 
adjustment, heralding the transformative possibilities of fantastical urban cityscapes, savvy 
tech entrepreneurs, and commercial dynamism. Africa, we’ve been told, has risen (The 
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Economist 2011), a conversion driven in part by globally circulating models of economic 
inclusion, which claim a universal ideal of the entrepreneur as catalyst of new economies of 
development. The disciplining of labour that marked the 20th century has been supplanted by 
national visions of an enterprise economy, premised not on a nation of wage labourers, but 
of incubators, accelerators and business process outsourcing. From Luanda and Lagos, to 
Johannesburg and Nairobi, we find the entrepreneur, whether petty trader, businessperson, 
app developer, or start-up guru, serving as host for broader ideas about progress, modernity, 
and economic development.  
  Hailed as the future of business, and increasingly of development policy, 
entrepreneurship1 has been reconfigured as the new (improved) employment, an ideological 
salve for the political problem of jobless growth and shrinking state coffers. But, its 
contemporary position at the frontiers of African capitalism is premised on nearly a century 
of attention to the African labouring subject, figured and reconfigured through the colonial 
and post-colonial eras in a drive to construct a rational, enterprising ‘economic man’2 (Hood 
1997) as both a means to and an emblem of cultural and political-economic ‘progress.’  
 This paper3 tracks efforts by colonial and post-independence governments in Kenya, 
as well as international development institutions, to supress the ostensibly collectivist and 
‘underproductive’ African habitus,4 and to craft, through a set of discursive techniques and 
corporeal practices, 5  an enterprising and efficient ‘economic man’ conditioned to fuel 
capitalism through different forms of market engagement (Hood 1997). Adopting a 
Foucaultian concept of discourse as a form of power/knowledge that constitutes subjects 
(Foucault, 2000), this paper traces the rationalities, strategies, technologies, and techniques 
that have been marshalled in the production of ‘economic man’. This subject entails a 
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changing ideal of selfhood, one that is male,6 industrious and future-oriented, centred on 
individuals and nuclear families rather than communities,7 and tethered to the values of 
accumulation and consumption. 
 The paper begins in early 20th century Kenya, when the administration of the East 
African Protectorate declared the African habitus an obstacle to economic development and 
the African subject in need of improvement, their presumed ‘idleness’ and inefficiency a 
pressing colonial concern. Inducements to work ensued, including a host of ordinances, and 
later, the inculcation of new dispositions: a work ethic premised on industrial time 
discipline, improved labour output, and future thinking, and a reorientation toward long-term 
urban settlement in nuclear families. Thus, the permanent wage labourer, reoriented towards 
a non-communal life, was socialized to embody the qualities of the ‘right kind’ of African 
worker (Cooper 1992). 
The paper then turns to Kenya’s post-Independence period, when government efforts 
to deliver much-anticipated socio-economic benefits to a newly independent populace 
constellated around the role African enterprise could play in building a prosperous future. 
The ‘native’s’8 enterprising activities such as hawking and street trading, discounted by the 
colonial regime as a brake on modernity, were revisioned as a palliative for the surfeit of 
labour and Kenya’s informal sector was rebranded as a space of dynamism and creativity 
integral to the country’s economic future. Yet despite the initial optimism surrounding post-
colonial entrepreneurs, concerns regarding their productivity and efficiency remained. The 
international development community feared enterprise was hamstrung by a corrupt state, 
and that informal workers lacked savvy in the ways of capitalist enterprise and its requisite 
market dispositions. By the 1990s, as structural adjustment policies hollowed out the 
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Kenyan economy and opportunities for employment became scarce, a ‘new generation of 
African entrepreneurs’ (NGAEs) (McDade and Spring 2005: 17), hailing not from Nairobi’s 
hand-to-mouth economy but from the ‘missing middle’, became championed as the object of 
Kenya’s modernist hopes and expectations.  
Following the turn of the millennium, the spirit of entrepreneurialism advanced by the 
NGAE extended into new realms and actors. With mass joblessness and rapid urbanisation, 
and an expanding population of precarious youth threatening civil unrest, national and 
international development efforts began to focus on incorporating Kenya’s youth into 
networks of global capitalism through entrepreneurial activities. In particular, informal 
settlements, the target of market-oriented logics and discourses, were recast as pools of 
‘natural’ assets – resourcefulness, ingenuity, opportunism and socially embedded webs of 
economic exchange – to be parlayed into job creation and economic renewal. Echoing 
earlier framings of African labour as ‘idle’, ‘underproductive’ and ‘undisciplined’, the 
transformation from jobless youth to entrepreneur entailed enculturation into the idealized 
neoliberal subject, individually responsibilised for economic transformation. 
Across these periods, we see how Africans are constituted as labouring subjects 
through processes Foucault terms ‘modes of objectification’ (Foucault 1982: 777), from the 
way disciplinary technologies construct the colonial labouring subject as an object of control 
and enact dividing practices to segregate and categorise labour, to how entrepreneurs 
constitute themselves as enterprising subjects in the post-millennial period. These processes 
reflect different modalities of power and governmental rationalities, as seen in the shift from 
efforts to cultivate, rehabilitate, and discipline Africa subjects under colonial liberalism, to 
the neoliberal regime centred on the production of self-regulating entrepreneurs, who will 
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maximize their human capital (Foucault 2007). But, across time and space these 
governmental rationalities entail ‘the construction of specific ways for people to be’ (Du 
Gay 1996: 54) in economic relations, their potentialities fostered and co-opted for societal 
transformation. In particular, the UK Colonial Office, the colonial and post-independence 
governments in Kenya, and the international development community shared a common 
purpose: to convert the African ‘non-economic man’ (Cohen 1971, p. 210), anathema to 
progress and stability, into homo economicus of the market economy, a rational, self-
maximizing individual whose actions would bring Kenya more predictably into the fold of 
global capitalism (Williams 1999). Their efforts thus reveal ‘endoconsistency’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994: 19): a shared understanding that an underproductive and inefficient African 
labourer impeded the attainment of economic development and progress, and that future 
prosperity depended on reconstituting the African labouring habitus through bodily and 
psychological dispositions that aligned with regnant economic paradigms. As the paper 
highlights, the figure of the economic man, shaped to embody attitudes, norms, conduct and 
corporeal practices of efficiency and self-reliance, would possess the subjectivity upon 
which the hopes and expectations of the nation’s colonial and post-colonial economies 
would rest. 
 
Colonialism: The Problem of African Labor 
Concerns with the African ‘labouring habitus’ were articulated in Kenya as early as the turn 
of the twentieth century, when the newly established East Africa Protectorate required a 
large supply of cheap African labour to build roads and railways, and work on settler farms. 
The labour-exporting reserves of central Kenya, where Africans were resettled so that large 
 7 
tracts of agricultural land could be allocated to settler production (Melnick 2018), were 
harnessed to the project of empire building through a set of parasitic policies that governed 
what sorts of work Africans performed and for whom. When Africans refused to submit to 
the dictates of settlers, the colonial administration introduced Hut and Poll Taxes, pass laws, 
and forced labour, all of which were partially designed to compel work ‘from the natives 
who were unused to the benefits and obligations of continuous labor’ (cited by Okia 2012: 
42; italics mine; see also Clayton and Savage 1974). Further ‘inducements’ followed. In 
1910 the Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance extended the 1901 tax regulation, exacting 
taxes from each adult male who did not own a hut (Waris 2007). Despite these measures, 
control of African labour proved elusive; some Africans did not pay tax, refusing to sell 
cattle or work for Europeans, while others preferred to use income from selling surplus 
produce to pay taxes rather than serve as wage labourers for Europeans (Lind Holmes 1980). 
Describing the frustration this situation evoked, one settler commented: 
 
. . . it is grossly unfair to invite a settler to this country . . . to give him 
land under conditions which force him to work and at the same time to do 
away with the very foundation on which the whole of his enterprise is 
based, namely cheap labour, whilst the Native is allowed to retain large 
tracts of land on which he can remain in idleness (East African Standard, 
30 November 1907 cited by Lind Holmes 1980: 28). 
 
Such statements conveyed a moral crisis that extended beyond the economic need for 
labouring bodies. The presumed ‘idleness’ of Africans was the subject of searing colonial 
 8 
commentaries that cast it as a threat to economic development and moral rectitude. Conway 
Belfield, governor of Kenya between 1912 and 1917, noted in his address to the Legislative 
Council, ‘I am prepared to state definitely that we desire to make of the native a useful 
citizen, and that we consider the best means of doing so is to induce him to work for a period 
of his life for the European’ (cited by Buell 1928: 332). When Sir Edward Northey became 
Governor of the Protectorate in 1919, he reinforced this position, arguing that the viability of 
the Protectorate hinged on the profligacy of estate production, which could only be achieved 
by encouraging ‘the thousands of able bodied natives to work with the European settler for 
the cultivation of the land and improvement of stock’ (Minutes of the Legislative Council, 
24 February 1919, C.O. 544/6). The government would not allow Africans to remain ‘in 
uneducated and unproductive idleness’ (Clayton and Savage 1974:110) and the infamous 
Northey Circulars on labour recruitment encouraged District Commissioners to identify 
strategies, short of force, to induce ‘idle’ (male) Africans out of the reserves to work on 
European farms (Spencer 1974).  In organising and controlling the movement of Africans in 
this way, the colonial administration not only aimed to increase the number of labourers, but 
to forge a distinction between productive and unproductive forms of circulation and 
movement (Foucault 2007: 18), a ‘dividing practice’ (Foucualt 1982) that relegated African 
males to a spatially, socially and economically distinct category that could be governed. 
While relocating Africans to European farms was seen to curtail their indolence, ungoverned 
mobility was forcefully proscribed, the kipande ensuring Africans remained tethered to 
spatially fixed zones. 
During the inter-war years, with the colony reliant almost exclusively on agricultural 
exports, a spate of further legislation aimed to harness ostensibly ‘idle’ African labour (Lind 
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Holmes 1980: 37). The Resident Natives Ordinance and the Native Registration Ordinance, 
enacted in 1918 and 1919 respectively, introduced measures to secure and control labour as 
part of the broader ‘civilising mission’ in Kenya (Ogot 1974: 267). As Zelaza describes, 
such measures were understood as ‘an act of benevolence, a necessary “shock therapy” for 
people deeply mired in idleness and indolence’ (Zelaza 1992: 173). Though official policy 
prohibited forced labour on European farms and government projects, an amendment to the 
Native Authority Ordinance, introduced by the government in 1920, rendered Africans liable 
to perform compulsory labour on government works for up to 60 days/ year if they could not 
demonstrate they were either fully employed, or had been continually employed for 3 
months in the previous year (The Official Gazette 1921: 925). Compulsory labour and the 
requirement that chiefs mobilize it, was justified by Britain’s civilisational and moral 
imperative to wrest African subjects from their presumably self-destructive actions (Melnick 
2018). As Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, claimed: 
 
The difficulty in this question of native labour is to steer a middle course 
between allowing the natives to live in idleness and vice and using 
improper means to get them to work and permitting them to be employed 
on unfair terms or to be improperly cared for . . . Labour must be 
forthcoming if the country is to be developed as it should be. The country 
needs it and the native is better for it (Parliamentary Debate, 14 July 1920, 
cited by Lind Holmes 1980: 45).  
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Yet, as concerns grew that efforts toward compulsory labour were heavy-handed, the 
British pinned the fulfillment of the colony’s labour needs on professional recruiters, whose 
services expanded considerably in the post WWI period (Ocobock 2017). Combing the 
reserves for young Africans who would be sent to labour camps and subsequently to private 
employers, recruiters became key intermediaries in the construction of economic man, 
complicit in constituting and governing ‘productive’ African workers and facilitating the 
state’s capacity to ‘conduct the conduct’ of men during colonial rule (Foucault 2002: 341). 
Though the economic reformation of the ‘native’ largely pivoted on appropriating 
wage labour for plantations and factories, it concomitantly entailed suppressing the 
otherwise ‘enterprising’ activities of Africans such as selling European commodities or 
independently cultivating and selling cash crops, seen to inhibit the progress toward national 
‘advancement’ (Melnick 2018). 9  Nonetheless, by the 1930s, the effects of the global 
recession had upturned the labour situation with the supply of African labour exceeding 
demand, resulting in a discursive and policy shift toward the quality of African labour and 
the self-transformation this required. The presumed inefficiency and lacklustre performance 
of African male workers became the colony’s most pressing concern, as well as the focus of 
employers’ disciplinary gaze. 
 
Colonial Developmentalism 
By the late 1930s, putative links between the rise in rural-to-urban labour migration and 
social breakdown gave way to anxieties over perceived delinquency and unrest among 
African labour. Colonial authorities began to fear the impact of ‘detribalisation’ – the 
severing of ties between male migrant labour and their families in the reserves. Though 
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settlement in the reserves allowed colonial officials/industry to benefit from low wages, as 
women ensured social reproduction and cultural stability, anxieties that the conscription of 
male labour would unravel the social and moral fabric of rural communities and erode tribal 
stability (Spencer 1974) surfaced palpably in the 1930s and 1940s. Marking a departure 
from the self-interested economic man conceived by Adam Smith (1976) and John Stuart 
Mill (1967), the administration feared that modernisation, and especially a wage economy 
driven by migrant labour, was encouraging African individualism (Throup 1987) and a 
dereliction of duty towards kin and community (Colonial Office 1948). As Cooper 
(1996:52), citing a Quaker missionary noted, labour ‘migration disrupted the one strong 
asset Africans had—the “integrated solidarity and mutual dependence” of their 
communities.’ Furthermore, as White (1990) describes, colonial officials were concerned 
that the loneliness of urban migrant labourers, detached from wife and family, would create 
a feral underclass vulnerable to militant activities, concerns that peaked in the wake of the 
1939 Mombasa Dock Strike. Taming a ‘truculent working class became’ imperative to 
realising ‘orderly progress’ in the colony (Cooper 1989: 746). 
 Entwined in these questions of labour and unrest was an increasingly interventionist 
approach guiding British colonial policy during and after WWII (Lewis 2000), in which 
disciplinary control over labour was interwoven with forms of pastoral care that aimed to 
enhance workers’ well-being. 10  In 1940 the UK government passed the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act, marking the first allocation of resources from the metropole 
directed towards raising the living standards of colonial peoples through social and 
economic development.11 Marking a shift away from the extractivist arms-length approach 
espoused under indirect rule (Cooper 2002), a new phase in so-called enlightened 
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imperialism commenced (Lewis 2000). The new ethos of colonial developmentalism held 
that the maturing of colonial nations could be accelerated through metropolitan solutions: 
the incorporation of the same institutions, principles and structures that characterised British 
national life. Transposed onto the same evolutionary track as the colonial powers, East 
Africa’s problems were now conceived not as somehow unique and intrinsic to Africa but 
as similar to those which faced the industrial world (Cooper 2002: 8). Maintaining a 
productive labour force would therefore require basic sanitary conditions, alongside proper 
nutrition and rudimentary health care; interventions in the physical and intimate conditions 
of life which resembled the state-led welfarism and public health initiatives of the 
metropole. Wages too became the subject of scrutiny and investigation, with the 
interventionist state eventually setting minimum wage levels within certain sectors (Cooper 
1989). The efficiency and productivity of African labour thus became a problem of 
development, one that could be tackled by establishing standards of worker welfare that 
would ensure the economic and social stability of Africans (Cooper 1987). While the turn to 
welfare embodied the pastoral elements of colonial power, such efforts were arguably less 
concerned with the well being of Africans than with producing an able-bodied ‘[h]omo 
economicus to fuel the market economy’  (Kalpagam 2000: 420). 
 
Shaping the African Worker 
Despite efforts to link economic development to welfarist interventions, the productivity of 
the native worker continued to be a ‘dominant problem’ in East Africa (Orde-Browne 
1946: 15), one deemed to stem as much from African culture as from labour conditions. 
The 1947 African Labour Efficiency Survey, conducted with 6000 workers on the Kenya-
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Uganda Railway, linked the problem of efficiency directly to ‘the native’, portrayed as 
innately unsuited to discipline, averse to labour, and indifferent to wages (Northcott 1949: 
26). Yet, convinced that the colonial state could overcome this deficit through tutelage in 
‘correct’ dispositions, Northcott, executor of the survey, and his team identified a strategy 
to cultivate a sense of drive and efficiency among East African labourers. Their first step 
was to understand the mentality, ways of working and motivations of native labourers. ‘We 
must necessarily begin with the individual’, the survey detailed, ‘he must be understood as 
the product of a specific tribal culture in which he has been created and by which his habits 
and attitudes, his feelings and customs have been shaped…. He cannot be known without 
knowledge of his life on the Reserves’ (Northcott 1949: 78). Those working with native 
labourers were thus encouraged to become acquainted with customary activities on the 
reserve, as a means to reform their workers. 
 Second, Northcott’s survey focused on techniques through which to cultivate 
subjects with the skills, knowledge and habits needed to propel the colonial economy 
forward (Hood 1997). According to the survey, training was the primary tool for 
developing effective workers; this training, the survey stated, should be ‘direct, detailed 
and “right on the spot’’’ and ‘by reason of the native’s mentality, to be repeated again and 
again’ (Northcott 1949: 120). Reflecting broader Euro-American racial discourses of the 
era (Blanton 2000), repetition and emulation were the pedagogical methods considered 
most suitable for native workers whose capacity for abstract analysis was deemed wanting. 
According to Major Orde Brown, a Labor Advisor to the Colonial Office, in-situ training 
was to be complemented by encouraging students to take up ‘a practical aim in life’ (Orde-
Browne 1946: 25): a vocational orientation to mitigate the risks of aspirations raised by 
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universal education. Indeed, colonial authorities feared that schooling was ‘a snare rather 
than a benefit’ (ibid: 26), instilling ‘ideas that worked against the discipline and control of 
the workforce’ and engendering unrest and criminality among the youthful population, 
with educated, aspirational subjects posing a threat of resistance against the colonial 
regime (Hood 1997: 1986). Efforts to inculcate European values were thus circumscribed 
by the need to sustain colonial hierarchies; the development of racial- or class-
consciousness was to be avoided (Desai 2001, Cooper 1992).   
 Time, too, was deemed central to the problem of labour, with African’s slow 
‘progress’ and failure to ‘keep up with time’ a source of colonial anxiety (Nanni 2012: 90). 
Time signified broader moral values, demarcating clear boundaries the idle and 
industrious, the aimless and goal-oriented, the improvident and disciplined (Dolan and 
Rajak 2018). Like Weber’s ascetic Protestantism, in which the productive use of time gave 
direction and purpose to individual action, adherence to time regimes was cast as the 
channel to becoming a useful, reliable employee (Weber 2011). Yet while colonial officials 
perceived punctuality, or deference to clock time, as essential to productive labour, these 
markers of the workday were considered arbitrary by some African workers, who did not 
share in the settlers’ prescribed rhythms of productivity. The African Labour Efficiency 
Survey posited that although workers had largely understood the relationship of time to 
wages, the correlation between time and output proved harder to construct; workers were 
seen to lack the correct tempo of labour, working slowly and haphazardly (Northcott 1949: 
59). However, rather than rely on threats of dismissal or the rough discipline of the 
foreman, the survey suggested improving workers’ motivation through, for example, 
displaying individual output on wall charts that would appeal to workers’ (presumed) 
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enjoyment of competition, a precursor to the pedagogical techniques deployed to shape the 
conduct of the neoliberal enterprising subject (du Gay 1996). . 
 In addition to day-to-day time discipline, the wider temporal horizons of native 
workers were an object of concern, even as the colonial period edged to its close. The 
colonial regime depicted local Africans as living irredeemably in the moment, lacking the 
capacity for future planning that characterizes the so-called rational activities of the 
economic man. ‘To plant in order to harvest is normally the furthest limit of foresight and 
providence’ explained the 1956 Inter-African Labour Institute (IALI) report, ‘discipline 
and organisation do not exist except as a spontaneous collective reaction to the rhythm 
imposed by the seasons’ (IALI 1956:35). Although work rhythms had already been altered 
by the earlier development of plantation slavery along the coast (Cooper 1992), colonial 
discourses constructed African smallholders as inhabiting the same timeless present of the 
early anthropological subject (Fabian 1983), with the agricultural calendar’s cyclical 
rhythm foreclosing the progressive temporal horizons wage labour required. 
 Crucially, progressive time was underpinned by open-ended aspirations for 
accumulation, which contrasted with the finite goals of ‘target-workers’ who sought to 
earn a pre-defined amount to pay for a specific object, such as taxes or a dowry. These 
workers could not be induced to keep labouring once their target had been reached: a 
sating of desires that unsettled the dynamics of capitalist production. For colonial 
authorities, stimulating a desire for consumer goods (Hood 19997) and inculcating 
‘correct’ spending habits was closely bound with cultivating the African economic man; as 
the African Labour Efficiency Survey stated: ‘there remains the most difficult lesson of all 
for the African, that of learning to appraise money and to use it’ (Northcott 1949: 8).12 
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Suitability for labour implied acquiring not only the disciplines of production but 
consumption too, presaging the much-lauded emancipatory potential of markets under 
austerity and neoliberalism. 
 
Stabilisation: Making a Working Class Habitus 
In 1953 the Kenyan government created the Carpenter Committee to investigate wage and 
productivity levels. Its conclusions drew a pointed contrast with previous decades, positing 
that ‘traditional’ cultural structures stymied efficiency and individual accumulation.  Like 
the East Africa Royal Commission (1953-1955), which undertook an investigation of 
factors conducive to economic development in the region, 13  the Carpenter Committee 
concluded that progress was rooted in the ‘human factor’ (Hood 1997: ii). Improving 
performance would require removing the African ‘from the enervating and retarding 
influence of his economic and cultural background’ (Kenya 1954: 3), which were 
impediments to ‘industry, efficiency and increased output’ (IALI 1956:11). Indeed, while 
racialised notions of innate inferiority and laziness had gradually receded in imperial state 
discourses, ‘traditional’ customs and social structure were cast as fettering native workers 
to inefficiency, with the security of kin and community obviating ambition, self-reliance 
and the incentive to work (Jones 1960). Even the customs governing hospitality were 
believed to dampen the demand for wage work, acting as ‘insurance premium for the 
future’ (ibid: 54). Yet the much-maligned influence of culture could be overcome, the 
Carpenter Committee proclaimed: extricating the workforce from tribal influences and 
cultural constraints would shape Africans anew, with positive ramifications for labour 
productivity (Kenya 1954). 
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 Hence, in the colonial state’s final decade, a policy of labour stabilisation gained 
increased traction as a strategy to avert the perceived threat of ‘bodies out of place’ 
(Melnick 2018: 67). Labour stabilisation, which called for the permanent settlement of 
workers near their employment, contrasted with the pre-Second World War preference for 
migratory and flexible flows of workers, ‘part-time proletarians’ (Smart 2011:63) who 
retained connections to native reserves, the sites of ethnicity, custom and solidarity. Where 
unaccompanied migrants had previously dominated employment in Nairobi and Mombasa, 
the state restyled its vision of the African labourer as a man living permanently in the city 
with his nuclear family, retrained and reoriented towards a non-communal life (Kenya 
1954: 95). Stabilisation was a breeding ground for this new industrial lifestyle, grounded in 
the nuclear family, schooling, and the stability of wage labour. To sever ties to the 
traditional social and economic structures of kin and tribe, municipal housing was 
developed to allow nuclear family units to settle together (Walmsley 1957), and wages 
were reconceptualised as a family provision (Kenya 1954), thereby re-casting kinship units 
through middle-class British norms. Thus, to ensure productivity, the regime not only 
sought to govern and control labour through the reorganisation of space (see Foucault 
1991),  but to ensure that the local population shared in the fundamental values of the 
settlers – not only as related to waged labour, but also, and more crucially, as related to self 
and family: the units upon which a valuation of waged labour was premised. 
 
Post-Independence 
During the first decade of independence, the Kenyan state turned its attention to a new 
economic man—the smallholder farmer—who would catalyse national development by 
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rejuvenating underproductive landholdings and improving export performance. In contrast 
to the colonial state, the newly installed Kenyatta government offered producers a means 
of production, successfully transferring thousands of hectares of highly productive land 
from colonial estates to African ownership through the Swynnerton Plan, which 
transformed ‘peasant’ farming into an entrepreneurial endeavor by opening up new 
opportunities for the cultivation of cash crops such as tea, coffee, and hybrid maize 
(Legovini 2002, O’Brien and Ryan 1999).  Amidst a buoyant post-independence economy, 
the farmer-cum entrepreneur was idealised as a risk-taking, forward-looking pragmatist at 
the heart of nationalist aspirations. 
 During the late 1970s, however, Kenya’s international position as a postcolonial 
success story foundered. A series of economic shocks — the boom/bust cycle of coffee and 
tea prices in 1976-79, the dismantling of the unity (EAC) in 1977, and the second oil shock 
of 1979 — dampened the nation’s economic performance and handicapped the capacity of 
the state to sustain post-independence growth and prosperity (O’Brien and Ryan 1999). 
The labour market underwent a reversal of conditions: from excess demand to an excess 
supply of labour. The state faced a new employment problem, rooted in the structural 
changes of rapid population growth and swelling urban migration, alongside aspirations 
borne of education (Callaway 1963); the desire for betterment and progress was chafing 
against the realities of what the state could deliver. 
 With a large reservoir of unemployed labourers, the Kenyan government had to 
render productive an ever-increasing labour supply. Though state efforts focused primarily 
on the agricultural sector, the discovery of ‘an adequate reserve of men who have the 
judgment, the initiative, the courage and the determination to conceive and launch new 
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enterprises’ also became central to realising the state’s aspirations for economic 
development (Berkoff 1974: vii). The native enterprising activity largely supressed by 
colonial regimes was now subject to keen interest among the Kenyan government14 and 
international development agencies, which perceived small-scale enterprise as a would-be 
remedy for both labour oversupply and the frustrated aspirations of an educated, 
unemployed generation. 
 
Hiding in Plain Sight: The Discovery of African Enterprise 
In 1972 an International Labour Organisation (ILO)/ United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) mission convened in Nairobi to discus the employment problems 
facing Kenya. The mission was part of the ILO’s World Employment Programme, which 
brought employment generation into the centre of national planning in the Global South 
(Bangasser 2000). Though several recommendations targeted the agricultural sector, the 
mission also heralded the discovery of vast reserves of economic potential in the 
unregulated activity of the ‘informal sector’ (ILO 1972; see also Hart 1973). The term, 
chosen to avoid the binary of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’, sought to redress the bias against 
the productive activities of the poor.15 No longer relegated to the ‘unemployed or those 
underemployed in petty trade, primitive crafts, begging and other low productivity 
activities’ (Harbison 1967:191), the informal economy was recast as a dynamic force, 
characterised by labour-intensive production and low barriers to entry: a sponge to absorb 
the growing ranks of the unemployed. Rather than a vestige of an incomplete 
modernisation, the informal economy was restyled as pivotal to Kenya’s future, a reservoir 
of growth that could stem rising rates of poverty and unemployment (Potts 2007).  
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 Yet, optimism surrounding the ‘discovery’ of entrepreneurs in the nation’s 
smallholdings (‘enterprising peasants’ [Tiffen 1976]) and towns (‘hawkers’ and 
‘businessmen’ [Dinwiddy 1974]) was soon tempered. These entrepreneurs were not, 
according to many of their international development chroniclers (Garlick 1971, Hoseltiz 
1964, Dinwiddy 1974), the innovative, disruptive entrepreneurs described by Schumpeter16 
as pillars of economic development. Like their colonial predecessors, post-colonial 
commentators depicted African enterprises as constrained by culture and tradition, arguing 
that kinship militated against investment and enterprise growth, with businessmen 
diverting profits and capital to provide for their extended families (Garlick 1971). 
 Once again, the problems of African enterprise were deemed to start with ‘the 
characteristics of African businessmen themselves – particularly with their motivation, 
their social environment, their individual capacity and experience, and their collective 
reputation’ (Dinwiddy 1974: 6). While African business owners saw access to credit or 
finance as the central limiting factors to their enterprises, national and international 
agencies downplayed these difficulties, instead focusing on entrepreneurs’ presumably 
underdeveloped market dispositions, a narrative that persists in contemporary models of 
small-scale entrepreneurship (Dolan and Rajak 2016). A lack of personal financial 
discipline, claimed Dinwiddy (1974), an officer with the UK Foreign Commonwealth 
Office, hindered entrepreneurs, whose reputation for financial irresponsibility and late 
payment of debts was equated with a failure to invest, plan and ensure the growth of 
enterprises (Volker 1997). Previous doubts as to the managerial capacity of native workers 
also carried through to assessments of African entrepreneurs, whose reluctance to delegate 
or form partnerships was framed as impeding growth (Dinwiddy 1974). Furthermore, 
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becoming ‘successful’ entrepreneurs would require a temporal transition: rejecting the 
fulfilment of rewards in the here-and-now, for goal-oriented, future thinking. As with the 
construction of the colonial labourer, the transition into entrepreneurship demanded that 
individuals move beyond day-to-day business planning into the wider sphere of economic 
action, marked by prudent production and consumption (Dolan and Rajak 2016). 
 Reflecting both a personal and a circumstantial failing, the problem of the 
entrepreneur was also the problem of the African workforce, as development practitioners 
and policy makers construed both the labourer and the entrepreneur as insufficiently 
steeped in capitalist culture to enact the productive roles assigned to them: ‘The African 
entrepreneur is likely to have to recruit his labourers from a pool of manpower in which 
industrial culture is as yet only faintly known and appreciated’, explained Hoselitz (1964: 
103), leading to high supervision costs due to insufficient training and workers’ limited 
attention spans. At the same time, the Kenya state was also decried for its putative anti-
capitalist mentality and viewed by European and American development institutions as an 
obstacle to entrepreneurship (ILO 1972). Inefficient, bureaucratic, enmeshed in the 
corruption of kin and tribe, the indigenised government was part of the problem (Dinwiddy 
1974). An entrepreneurial culture would therefore require a new ‘enabling environment’ 
for unfettered capitalism: deregulation and privatisation, the central economic and political 
strategy of neoliberalism (Read 2009). 
 
Saviours of Development: The Modern African Entrepreneur 
As the 1980s opened, Kenya’s economic situation, like much of Africa, soured 
considerably. The economic shocks of the late 1970s were compounded by mounting fiscal 
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deficits, deteriorating international terms of trade, and rising levels of poverty (Legovini 
2002). With publication of the World Bank’s influential Berg Report in 1981, Kenya 
joined the ranks of African states whose perceived inefficiencies were subjected to a 
radical mix of market liberalisation, fiscal pruning, and public-sector privatisation, the 
three pillars of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ (Goldman 2004).  In 1980, Kenya 
was among the first countries to receive an adjustment loan from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), activating a regime of fiscal discipline and market rationality that 
would regulate the institutions of state, economy and family for subsequent decades 
(O’Brien and Ryan 1999). 
 During the 1980s and 1990s, fast-growing enterprise and its corollary figure – the 
‘modern’ entrepreneur (Marsden 1990)– came to be seen as the source of economic 
growth, prosperity and employment opportunities. Dovetailing with the ascendancy of 
neoliberal enterprise culture in the US and UK, a new form of  ‘homo oeconomicus’ 
emerged: the entrepreneurial self (Foucault 2008: 226.), beneficiaries not of the state but of 
their own enterprising selves.  Entrepreneurs were cast as ‘pioneers of development’, their 
protagonism extending beyond the economic realm into social development: transforming 
lives, improving the environment, bringing health and welfare to their communities and 
countries (ibid.).  If the informal economy was a salve for unemployment, the 
entrepreneurs of the middle, i.e. those ‘lying between the informal sector on the one hand 
and large foreign- or state- owned enterprises on the other’, offered potential for growth; 
they were to be the ‘true engine’ of industrialisation that could ‘help alleviate poverty and 
advance social progress’ (ibid.: 6, 13). While some development policy makers declared 
the entrepreneur of the middle ‘missing’ (World Bank 1989, Ferrand 1996). Marsden 
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(1990: 5), an economist with the World Bank, claimed that ‘the middle is not missing’; 
Kenya had several thousand ‘modern African entrepreneurs’, with many waiting to join 
their ranks and realize their entrepreneurial dreams. 
 The ‘modern’ African entrepreneur became part of what McDade and Spring 
(2005: 17) term, ‘the New Generation of African Entrepreneurs’ (NGAEs), self-
consciously modern business people who organised regional enterprise networks, and 
received funding from international agencies such as United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the European-based Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the early 1990s, regional enterprise networks 
began to emerge in West, East and Southern Africa, seeking to grow markets for African 
businesses beyond national borders through new investment opportunities and forms of 
private sector regional co-operation (ibid.). 
 Representing an entrepreneurial vanguard in East Africa, the NGAEs juxtaposed 
themselves against the African mode of business. Their modernity rehearsed the dichotomy 
of a ‘backwards’ continent, their practices seen as distinct from those of traditional African 
businessmen. The NGAEs were said to hire based on merit, not kinship; to apply cutting-
edge personnel management techniques, rather than apprenticeship or tutelage. Instead of 
diversifying, the NGAEs focused on growing their businesses, expanding through credit 
rather than savings as they took calculated risks. In contrast with the corruption often 
associated with African enterprises and their inter-mingling of family and business, the 
NGAEs preached and practiced transparency, employing auditors, accountants and other 
modern business practices. A sense of optimism also distinguished NGAEs from their less 
dynamic peers; where entrepreneurial zeal was often stifled by poor infrastructure, political 
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instability, and corruption, the NGAEs viewed such ‘crises not as hopeless, but as fertile 
ground for business opportunities’ (ibid:26). For the ‘modern’ African entrepreneurs, 
success relied on their own agency, confidence and a can-do attitude, a faith in their 
individual capacities to deliver a promising future. 
 Possessed of a complete set of entrepreneurial virtues, ‘modern African 
entrepreneurs’ were, as Marsden describes, no different from entrepreneurs elsewhere in 
the world’ (Marsden 1990: 22), an archetype that transcended place, culture and ethnicity. 
Endowed with entrepreneurial wherewithal, they did not need the ‘paternalistic’ 
programmes directed at colonial labourers or development’s micro-entrepreneurs. Rather, 
they required business-enabling environments, encouraging the further retreat of the state 
through deregulation and tax reduction, as well as access to credit and markets (ibid; see 
also the World Bank’s annual Doing Business Reports, initiated in 2004 to measure the 
regulations that enhance and curtain business worldwide). 
 
Enterprising Culture: Everyone is an Entrepreneur 
While led by NGAEs, the spirit of entrepreneurialism was not confined to their milieu. As 
Nelson and Johnson (1997) detail, another response to the failings of small enterprises to 
grow in Kenya was the ambition to inculcate enterprising virtues and values through 
education. According to the 1988 Presidential Working Party on Education and Manpower 
Training for the Next Decade and Beyond, the development of an ‘enterprise culture’ 
necessitated integrating business, technology, self-employment, and entrepreneurship into 
education and training programs (ibid.). In 1990, with UNDP funding and the support of 
the ILO, students in Kenya’s technical training institutions were required to complete 154 
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hours of entrepreneurship education.17 Developing the correct attributes and disciplines of 
self-employment, that is, an entrepreneurial subjectivity, was twinned with an attempt to 
redirect aspirations towards self-employment as a desirable career path, constructing 
precarious micro-entrepreneurship as a vocation like any other.  Entrepreneurial education 
thus extends a new form of governmentality, one that tethers the newly fashioned 
subjectivities of students to the rationality of the market (Dahlstedt and Hertzberg 2012). 
 Moreover, the entrepreneur was to be ‘a role model in the community, a provider of 
employment opportunities for others, a stabilizing factor in society, and a primary 
contributor to the development of natural and human resources’ within the nation; the 
central protagonist of social and economic development (ibid.:11-12). Thus, while the 
inculcation of the neoliberal entrepreneurial subjectivity was considered central to 
becoming successful entrepreneurs, the reverse was also true: entrepreneurship education 
was a way of instilling and transmitting a neoliberal sensibility among Kenyan citizens. 
 
The Millennial Entrepreneur 
At the turn of the millennium, Kenya was again beset by economic malaise, crippled by 
rising oil prices, negative economic growth and high rates of unemployment (Sawai 2002). 
At the same time, like many African nations, Kenya was experiencing a ‘youth bulge’, 
with 75 percent of the nation’s population under the age of 30 (Samuel Hall 2017). Given a 
hollowed-out job market devoid of employment possibilities, youth did not deliver the 
much-feted demographic dividend such statistics foretold. Instead, with few opportunities 
for formal employment, a skills deficit, and devalued currency of diplomas and 
accreditations, youth faced a collision between aspiration and opportunity, their ensuing 
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disillusionment seen to foment crime and violence (Hope 2012). Like the detribalised and 
itinerant workers of the late-colonial period, idle, unemployed, 18 frustrated youth were 
portrayed as a threat to the state, their disaffection a harbinger of radicalisation (Dolan and 
Rajak 2018). 
 Within this context, the quest for ‘inclusive markets’ that incorporate Africa’s 
youth has become a key focus of national development,19 with entrepreneurship, enterprise 
and innovation among both men and women, touted as a prophylactic against the scourge 
of ‘idleness’ and crime. 20  As Higgins notes, ‘The most solid conclusion that can be made 
is that while formal employment is important to promote, the realities of Kenya’s economy 
demand that youth are better prepared to become their own informal innovators’ (Higgins 
2013). Put another way, in an economy decimated by years of ruthless structural 
adjustment and neoliberal reforms, youth were seen as their own best bet for economic 
betterment. 
 As market subjects, however, youth required reformation. Mirroring colonial 
efforts to instil character, discipline, and professional skills among youth detained at 
Wamumu camp for boys chronicled by Ocobock (2017), remaking millennial youth 
entailed a confluence of moral rehabilitation and market preparedness. Since the turn of the 
millennium, Kenya has launched a pro entrepreneurial policy environment, in which youth 
figure centrally. In 2005, the government created the Ministry of State for Youth Affairs21 
to address youth concerns, and in 2006 developed Kenya’s first National Youth Policy and 
the ‘Youth Enterprise Development Fund’ (YEDF) (Hope 2012). In 2017, the Ministry of 
Information, Communication and Technology began training youth across the country on 
how to find and register for online work, under the assumption that online jobs would help 
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to abate rising youth unemployment, while providing a cheap labour source for companies 
(Korir 2017). But undoubtedly the most spectacular paean to entrepreneurship lies in 
Kenya’s Vision 2030, the country’s long-term blueprint for development that seeks to 
transform Kenya into a newly industrialising, middle-income country by 2030. Praised for 
uniting the nation behind a common vision of progress (Correspondent 2018), its execution 
rests on what the Secretariat deems the entrepreneurial ‘spirit of Vision 2030; hard work, 
innovation and personal discipline’ (Kibati 2013). Central to this vision is Kenya’s aim to 
leverage and enhance the nation’s flourishing technology sector to spin a future that moves 
beyond agriculture and manufacturing. These entrepreneurial ambitions are rooted in a new 
techno-optimism, a belief that harnessing the power of science and technology will deliver 
a progressive national future, witnessed in Nairobi’s moniker, ‘Silicon Savannah’ (Smith 
2012). A lynchpin in this new ‘world class environment’ of commercial dynamism and 
technological progress is Konza City, a proposed, ‘smart’ techno-utopia of technology 
hubs, skyscrapers, luxury malls, and stadiums situated 60 kilometres south-east from 
Nairobi (Johari 2015). Expected to emerge as the largest technology city in Sub Saharan 
Africa, Konza aspires to inhabit the same urban entrepreneurial aesthetic as Singapore and 
Dubai, a sanitised vision of modernity where savvy tech entrepreneurs stroll tree lined 
boulevards in crisp, immaculately clean business suits. Importantly, Konza is not reserved 
for the high-tech entrepreneurs who populate the start-ups, incubators, and accelerators in 
Nairobi’s ‘platform economy’, but aims to unlock possibilities for enterprising youth who 
‘are getting choked up in the informal sector’ but ‘have education and entrepreneurial 
minds to tap into endless opportunities that come with a technological city’ (The Standard 
2016). Aspiring to serve as a sponge for Kenya’s legions of unemployed graduates, 
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Konza’s strategic plan includes a standard toolkit of entrepreneurial formation, including 
innovation events (e.g. expos, awards programs, youth camps, etc.), an investor outreach 
program for youth projects (Konza Technopolis 2014), and technical training institutions to 
offer pre-employment skills to unemployed youth (Wanyoike 2014): pedagogical practices 
that pin the nation’s developmentalist ideal to new modes of knowing and being. 
 On the other end of the spectrum are less grand entrepreneurial ambitions 
undertaken by a range of actors, from global corporations and international development 
institutions to the Kenyan state and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), which seek to 
‘conduct the conduct’ of (largely urban) idle youth, endowing them with an enterprising 
mindset that is driven as much from without as from within. The YEDF provides young 
people with entrepreneurship training to ‘reengineer the thinking and tactic of business 
success’ (YEDF 2016), and offers business development services and low-interest loans to 
start small- and medium-sized enterprises. As the chairman of the fund stated, ‘Our people 
are the most important resource that we have, and it is on their shoulders that we place the 
achievement of our goals’ (Osumba 2016). In contrast to the techno-utopia evoked by 
Konza City and the innovation hubs that now pervade Nairobi, here we find a more modest 
entrepreneurial vision; an incubator loan may assist a fledgling entrepreneur to start a 
poultry farm or buy a green house, while training offers a standard package of business 
skills, from writing a business plan to developing a record keeping system. Each of these 
enterprises reflects the government’s ambition to convert youth into job creators (YEDF 
2016), where youth’s newly-acquired business skills will facilitate the transition from 
‘necessity’ to ‘opportunity‘ entrepreneurs, allowing them to forsake hawking, trading and 
hustling to pursue livelihoods as ‘professional’ entrepreneurs who get ahead instead of 
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getting by. This distinction underpins a wide swath of entrepreneurial programming 
launched by the Kenyan government and a host of corporates, NGOs and social 
enterprises, which seek to convert the perceived habitus of informal workers, constructed 
through precarious and often illicit pursuits, into responsible, optimistic, value creators. As 
Balloon Ventures, an NGO funded by UK Aid that specialises in incubating 
entrepreneurialism in Kenya, writes: 
 
At Balloon, we’re trying to get people to think differently about 
entrepreneurship. When people think of an entrepreneur, we don’t 
want people just to think of Elon Musk, Jeff Bezons and Donald 
Trump (!). We want people to think about Bernard, who’s a street 
Hawker; Anita who’s a Dressmaker, Claudia who’s a fashion designer 
and Mildred, who owns a hair salon (Balloon Ventures 2019a). 
 
 For Balloon Ventures, the survivalist, necessity entrepreneurs of Africa’s informal 
economies are ‘superstars’ in waiting, ‘with the potential to grow big businesses if 
supported properly’ (Balloon Ventures 2019b). Bilateral donors such as USAID, social 
enterprises like Livelyhoods and corporations from Coca-Cola to Vodafone, now celebrate 
the transformations of youth in Nairobi’s informal settlements, marking their transition from 
aimless and ‘underproductive’ citizens to ‘responsible members of society’ through 
business and vocational skills training, mentorship, and financial support (USAID 2015). 
Yet despite the support conferred, and the ubiquitous emphasis on the creation of an 
business-enabling environment, entrepreneurial success is tethered to an individual’s 
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capacity to embody and enact paradigmatic entrepreneurial qualities — drive, creativity, 
flexibility (Dolan and Rajak 2016). Describing this unambiguously individualised vision of 
progress, the World Economic Forum (WEF) writes: 
 
The heart of entrepreneurship in developing economies rests squarely 
on the entrepreneurs themselves – those who bring vision, 
determination, passion, courage, resilience, the willingness to take 
risks, to adapt and innovate, to risk failure, and the ability to pick 
themselves up each time (WEF 2016). 
 
 WEF is not unique in its celebration of individual agency as the zeitgeist of 
entrepreneurial capitalism. However, the emphasis on individual action and performance 
eclipses how contemporary entrepreneurial schemes bank on the social capital of 
entrepreneurs to realize business objectives. Indeed, in contrast to the 1950s and 1970s, 
where custom, kin and culture were seen to thwart the flourishing of an entrepreneurial 
subject, models of entrepreneurship such as route to market programmes that sell products 
to those living ‘off the grid’ of contemporary retail, capitalize on the social networks of the 
poor, using them as infrastructure for distribution and sales (Dolan and Rajak 2016), and 
thereby encouraging the entrepreneurialisation of all aspect of life (Foucault 2008).22 
 Nonetheless, efforts to elevate individuals as responsible economic agents reflect a 
longer legacy of shaping African workers for economic gain. Contemporary 
entrepreneurial projects, for example, often pivot on new temporal structures that seek to 
govern entrepreneurs’ economic undertakings within the parameters of market time, while 
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promoting a temporal conversion from the here-and-now of survival to goal-oriented, 
future thinking. As Dolan and Rajak’s ethnography of Catalyst (ibid.), a social enterprise 
that offers un- and under-employed youth jobs as entrepreneurs selling ‘life-improving’ 
products in Nairobi’s slums details, the organisation deploys diktats on time efficiency and 
punctuality to produce entrepreneurial dispositions purged of the vernacular timescape of 
‘unproductive’ African time. At the same time, Catalyst continually emphasizes a 
distinction between the precariousness of the present and better things to come, claiming 
that sacrifice and determination in the here-and-now will unleash myriad rewards in the 
future (ibid.). Indeed, learning to be a goal-oriented, future-driven individual is presented 
as a virtue in itself, with ‘notions of progress and betterment embedded’ in capacity to 
plan, imagine and anticipate possibilities (Abram and Weszkalnys 2011: 14).  
 Mirroring earlier eras, where the refashioning of labour was seen as the path to 
economic stability, contemporary entrepreneurial discourse and practice correlate the 
development of an entrepreneurial subjectivity with broader prospects of national 
development (see also Honeyman [2016]). Bawisa (2017), for example, who advocates for 
a national entrepreneurship policy, promotes the importance of developing a new national 
mindset: ‘An entrepreneurship policy would motivate school children to answer differently 
the question... what do you want to be when you grow up? Rather than say, ‘I want to be a 
doctor’ they would say, ‘I want to own a hospital’ (ibid.). Instead of performing essential 
work for the wellbeing of the population, it is the maxim of ‘being your own boss’, 
premised on an ethic of individual self-maximisation, which is the valued currency in the 
new enterprise economy. Yet while reflecting neoliberal imaginaries of an enterprise 
culture that will ‘prepare youth to pursue livelihoods not in industry but in the free market’ 
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(Rajak and Dolan, unpublished), the labouring subject of the post millennium moment 
revivifies qualities—industriousness, diligence, foresight—of the idealised agent of 
capitalism, a figure whose continual reformation has been deeply implicated in power 
relations.  Indeed the neoliberal discourse of flexibility, self-maximisation and resilience, 
though clothed in language of choice and freedom, merely shifts the locus of power from 
the state to the market, supplanting the disciplinary techniques enacted by the colonial 
regime with the insecurity, fragility and contingency of an uncertain and risk-laden 
entrepreneurial future.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sketched a genealogy of the labouring subject in Kenya, from colonial 
plantations and factories to post-millennial entrepreneurs, describing the policies, practices 
and ideological work undertaken to mould African workers into productive economic 
agents. While the relationship between the exercise of power and the constitution of the 
labouring subject differed across colonial and post-colonial periods, from the disciplinary 
technologies of the colonial state to the neoliberal emphasis on self-reliance, there was a 
shared interest in curating a new economic subject with the qualities—productivity, 
efficiency, drive, future orientation, etc.—found lacking in the perceived torpor of the 
African habitus. Throughout the colonial era, for example, the spectre of ‘productivity’ 
loomed large, underpinning a range of efforts to reform the social and embodied 
dispositions of African labour deemed anathema to industrialisation. Colonial authorities 
sought to activate the African body as a means of production, purging a culture of 
‘idleness’ and vice through the virtue of work. Through training and tutelage the ‘idle’ 
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African male was remade as a productive and efficient proletarian, pressed into service to 
capitalism and slotted into a work process that demanded routinised and regimented forms 
of labour to fuel the settler economy. Following independence, the process of 
subjectification extended from the wage worker on plantations and in factories, to a new 
model of homo oeconomicus: the ‘modern’ entrepreneur, invoked as an instrument of 
broad-based development, whose can-do attitude and willingness to assume risks was 
framed as a route to prosperity and social progress. Possessing entrepreneurial virtues in 
spades, the new generation of African entrepreneurs embodied the antithesis of the much-
maligned African mode of business, their vision and acumen spearheading regional 
enterprise networks and investment opportunities. Importantly, while the emergence of the 
neoliberal, ‘modern’ entrepreneur marked a shift in the way in which African labour was 
defined and constituted as subjects, from disciplined wage workers to self-responsibilised 
entrepreneurial citizens, the latter was no less whetted and shaped as an object of policy.  
By the 1990s, for example, the Kenyan state, had succumbed to the entrepreneurial ethos, 
promoting self-employment and entrepreneurship education as an important part of 
economic development strategy. And, at the turn of the millennium, rebooting youth 
through entrepreneurial training resurfaced as key to the nation’s strategy for economic 
growth, and various forms of entrepreneurship, from door-to-door sales to digital 
entrepreneurship, were championed as testament to ‘Africa Rising’ (The Economist 2011). 
Though the idealized labourer of these different periods came into form through disparate 
methods of control, interventions and logics of governments and international development 
institutions, the qualities of the labouring subject remained a central object of social, 
political and economic concern (Rose 1998). 
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 Yet when viewed over a longer historical perspective, we find that efforts to 
remake Kenya’s economic man, whether the colonial wage labourer or the high tech 
millennial entrepreneur, reflected enduring anxieties about an incommensurability between 
‘western’ and ‘African’ modes of thought, seen to retard the development of the nation.  
Ambitions for economic stability and growth, for example, demanded a retooling of 
African vernacular norms and practices, their aberrant and ‘undisciplined’ temporal 
consciousness, deemed incongruous with the temporal registers of capitalism. African 
bodies were required to synchronize with capital’s rhythms, acquiescing to clock time in 
the industrial factory and complying with the temporal strictures of youth entrepreneurial 
schemes. Further, this linear conception of time, with its well-established orientation 
toward the future, imprinted expectation and anticipation into the labouring subject, 
entrepreneurial rationalities of discipline, determination and foresight delivering the 
market’s unalloyed promise: a ‘predictable futurity’ (Muehlebach 2013: 297). 
 The cultivation of productive ‘economic man’ also encompassed on-going, and 
often contradictory tensions between an occidental concepts of the autonomous, individual 
self and nuclear family, and an ‘African’ social body. In the early colonial period, 
apprehensions orbited around the detached migrant labourer, whose isolation from kin, 
culture and community presented a threat of social unrest. Ensuring a ‘productive’ and 
compliant male body on the factory floor required the stability of a resident nuclear family. 
Similarly, the Kenyan government and international development organisations alike 
constructed culture and tradition as obstructing the success of the post-independence 
entrepreneur, for whom kin and community militated against investment and business 
growth. In contrast, at the turn of the millennium, when the autonomous enterprising self 
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(du Gay 1996) became the leitmotif of Kenya’s post-agrarian economy (Melnick 2018), 
affective ties and social networks were reconstituted as a productive asset in 
entrepreneurial success.  
 Finally, the power of the millennial entrepreneurial discourse, which resignifies  
‘generation jobless’ as self-enterprising subjects, lies in a discursive flexibility that allows 
the Kenyan state and international development organisations to embrace and deploy 
seemingly opposing logics. Like early framings of African entrepreneurialism as innate 
(even indigenous), contemporary entrepreneurial programmes promote Nairobi’s informal 
settlements as a reservoir of ‘natural’ entrepreneurs, whose market savvy need only be 
unleashed and directed toward more ‘productive’ market forms. Yet at the same time, there 
is an emphasis on ‘producing’ entrepreneurs (and entrepreneurialism) through training, 
disciplining and transformation, with novel partnerships emerging to produce market 
subjects that will spawn new avenues of job creation and economic renewal. The power of 
the entrepreneurial discourse thus resides in its ability to operate in both registers, framing 
entrepreneurship as both always already present and yet possible to create (Rajak and 
Dolan nd).   
 In each of these transformations we see how regimes of power, whether the 
colonial administration, post-independence state, or international development institutions, 
sought to direct the course of capitalism by shaping the nature of the relationship between 
the ‘conduct of the individual person’ and the broader sphere of economic and social 
relations (Rose and Miller 1992: 180).  What this genealogy suggests, however, extends 
beyond the making of a productive cadre of economic men. Rather, the efficient and 
enterprising labourer has come to represent a set of ideas about the future of the nation, 
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deeply entwined with moral valuations of Kenya’s citizenry and with circulating idioms of 
development and economic growth. What is perpetually reasserted and rewritten in this 
evolution are the concepts of enterprise and entrepreneurialism themselves, continually 
invoked as a response to the shifting economic and political dynamics of colonial and 
postcolonial eras, and invested with a perennial capacity to reinvigorate the nation. 
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Notes 
                                                                
1 ‘Entrepreneurship’ is an ambiguous concept characterised by considerable discursive 
flexibility in the social science and management literature. Its elasticity allows it to 
accommodate a range of actors and models of economic action (wage labour, petty trade, 
small and medium-size enterprises, door-to-door selling, tech innovators etc.) across time 
and space. 
2 The trope of economic man (Homo economicus) can be (arguably) traced to John Stuart 
Mill (1967), whose turn to the neoclassical paradigm in the late 19th century replaced the 
Marxist view of economic value as a product of commodity production with a focus on the 
“the subjective calculations of individuals seeking to maximize their own utility” (Hahn 
and Hart 2011: 37).  Within economics, the concept has since come to represent a universal 
subject whose actions are premised on economic rationality, calculation and self-interest. 
In contrast, Foucault, anchored homo oeconomicus in the transition from classical 
liberalism to the neo-liberal form. Whereas the former—the 18th century homo 
oeconomicus—was represented as “one of the two partners in the process of exchange”, 
the latter is an “entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for 
himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings” (Foucault 2008: 
226).  
3 This paper is based on archival research conducted at the UK Public Records Office and 
the Kenya National Archives, and a range of secondary sources. Ethnographic research 
conducted on youth entrepreneurship in Kenya (2012-204) informed much of the 
discussion and analysis of millennial entrepreneurs.  
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4 Bourdieu (1990) defines habitus as socially learned dispositions, skills and ways of 
acting: a set of rules by which we interpret the social world from our particular position 
within it and that predispose us towards certain ways of behaving, thinking and acting.  
5 This paper is concerned with how a discursive regime centered on the construction of the 
productive and enterprising ‘economic man’ has operated and been reproduced in Kenya, 
through engagement with myriad institutions and actors, and across time.  It does not 
address the impact of this discourse on social reality. Though Kenyans have expressed 
agency in the face of discourses and practices thus entailed, this paper centers on the 
specific modalities through which “economic man” is conjured and the labourers it 
interpellates rather than how the discourse is interpreted or experienced. 
6 Throughout the colonial and early post-independence periods, economic development 
policies were focused largely on the African man. Women’s development, through 
education and craft production, was couched in terms of their reproductive role as mothers 
and wives (Hood 1997). 
7 Though the model of the productive economic man remains constant across time, how 
this idealised figure relates to wider social and communal relations shifts according to the 
broader policy and political economic environment, in which social relations vacillate 
between being an asset and constraint on economic development.  
8 The term ‘native’ is employed to reflect the nomenclature of the colonial state. The term 
‘Africans’ represents indigenous inhabitants of Kenya. 
9 The threat African production posed to the profitability of the settler farming community 
underpinned the establishment of native reserves, which aimed to force Africans ‘out of the 
produce market and into the labor market’ (Austin 2016: 318). 
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10 Foucault argued that pastoral power, originating in the Christian East, formed a 
foundation for forms of state-based governmentality. Exercised by a pastor over his flock, 
pastoral power held as its purpose the ultimate goal of individual salvation. In the ‘modern’ 
state, salvation is focused on this life rather than on the hereafter in the form of health, 
well-being, and security, etc. (Foucault 1982). 
11 The conditions under which Africans, particularly youth, laboured provoked heated 
criticism in Britain over a decade earlier, when the Colonial Office was accused of failing 
to honor their international obligations (Ocobock 2017). 
12 This assumption was challenged by Arthur Lewis (1955:103), whose work on African 
economic development concluded that Africans were ‘as materialistic and acquisitive as 
other peoples.’ 
13 The report of the commission, published in 1955 was dubbed ‘Adam Smith Goes to 
Africa’, reflecting a market-based perspective on economic development founded on 
privatisation and individualism  (Hunter 2015). 
14 As part of its strategy for economic indigenisation, the state issued trade licenses and 
works permits (Komollo 2010). 
15 See Betanav (2019) for a discussion of how the concept of the informal sector was part 
of a wider history of ILO attempts to identify a measure of un- and under-employment in 
‘least developed’ countries. 
16 Schumpeter theorised that the entrepreneur drove economic growth and development 
through a process of innovation and creative destruction (Schumpeter 1993). 
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